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Abstract
The Fukushima nuclear accident raised questions about the implementation of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety by the Japanese government and identified the need to
reassess the obligation of each contracting party deriving from the Convention and
IAEA safety standards. The author analyzes several major deficiencies such as the lack of
independence and effectiveness of the regulatory body, the failure to evaluate all relevant
site- and design-related factors, and design and construction of the installation, as well
as the emergency response, in order to determine the failure of the Japanese government
to comply with the Convention and exercise the obligation of due diligence. As a result,
the author demonstrates the fulfilment of two elements of state responsibility for nuclear
damage. The author also establishes the ineffectiveness of the Convention’s preventive
monitoring mechanisms and recommends the introduction of a stronger monitoring
regime and highlights the need to amend the Convention safety rules.
In its preliminary report1 six months after the Fukushima accident of 11March 2011,
some of the findings of the IAEA were that:
The tsunami hazard for several sites was underestimated. Nuclear regulatory systems
should address extreme external events adequately, including their periodic review, and
should ensure that regulatory independence and clarity of roles are preserved in all
circumstances in line with IAEA Safety Standards.2
The IAEA also found that, notwithstanding the fact that the catastrophe was caused by
a natural disaster, there were, inter alia, serious deficiencies in the siting and design of the
plant and the emergency readiness of the country, as well as an incomplete and imprecise
legislative and regulatory framework.3 Thus, the nuclear accident raised questions about
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1. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Nuclear
Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Preliminary Summary’’ (1 June
2011), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdfS.
2. Ibid., at 4.
3. See also The National Diet of Japan, ‘‘Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission’’ (1 October 2012), online: NAIIC /http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/
the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (NSC)4 and the IAEA safety
standards by the Japanese authorities. Moreover, the events prior and subsequent to the
accident demonstrated the need to revisit the obligations deriving from the various
provisions of the Convention, especially provisions relating to powers of the national
regulatory body and the safety of installations. Consequently, states producing nuclear
energy began to re-evaluate their own domestic nuclear energy capacity and regulatory
and legislative frameworks in order to assess the safety of national nuclear power plants
in the light of the Japanese catastrophe.5
The Fifth Review Meeting of the NSC was also convened in Vienna, Austria, from
4 to 14 April 2011 to discuss safety issues and draw lessons from the Fukushima
accident. At this meeting the parties also reiterated the need to:
[R]eaffirm their commitment to the objectives of the NSC: to achieve and maintain a
high level of nuclear safety worldwide through enhancement of national measures and
international cooperation; to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear
installations against potential radiological hazards and to prevent accidents with
radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur.6
This article will first briefly chronicle the events that occurred prior to and after the
accident in order to evaluate the response of the Japanese government. Second, it will
analyze the provisions of the NSC and the IAEA safety standards that are relevant in
this case. Third, it will evaluate the implementation of the relevant NSC provisions
by the Japanese authorities in order to assess its compliance with the Convention.
This consequently raises the issue of Japan’s international responsibility for wrongful
acts in the case of Fukushima. Finally, the suggestions and recommendations for
reviewing the effectiveness of the NSC provisions will be analyzed.
i. the fukushima accident
The nuclear accident that occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on
11March 2011was a result of a major earthquake of magnitude 9.0 and the subsequent
tsunami of 14 to 15 metres that rose at its highest to 39 metres at Aneyoshi, Miyako.7
The human consequences of these events were devastating. According to the UN Office
naiic_report.pdfS at 16. The Independent Investigation Commission appointed by the National Diet
was even more critical, calling the disaster a manmade disaster that was the result of collusion between
the government, the regulators, and TEPCO, and a lack of governance by said parties.
4. Convention on Nuclear Safety, 17 June 1994, 1963 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force 24 October 1994)
[NSC]. There are seventy-five contracting parties to the Convention and Japan is one of them.
5. See US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Nuclear Power Plant Tragedy in Japan
Briefing, 29 March 2011. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011 [US Senate Briefing];
European Commission, ‘‘Joint Declaration/Press Statement on Comprehensive Risk and Safety
Assessments of Nuclear Plants (‘stress tests’)’’ (23 June 2011), online: EC /http://ec.europa.euS;
European Union: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Interim Report on the Comprehensive Risk and Safety Assessments (‘‘stress
tests’’) of Nuclear Power Plants in the European Union, 24 November 2011.
6. IAEA, ‘‘Summary Report of the 5th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety’’ (4214 April 2011), online: IAEA /http://www-ns.iaea.orgS at 3.
7. See supra note 1 at 2.
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for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, around 16,600 persons went missing,
while many more were displaced from their homes.8 The World Nuclear Association
stated that the tsunami alone caused the deaths of 20,000 people.9 The natural disaster
also caused major destruction of infrastructure and the loss of many homes.10 The World
Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization highlighted enduring
health concerns which involve the development of cancer and other illnesses due to a
long-term radiation exposure as well as the radioactive contamination of food and
radioactivity of the soil and surrounding environment.11
Several nuclear power plants in the vicinity were affected by the natural disaster:
Tokai, Higashi Dori, Onagawa, Daiichi, and Dai-ni.12 The worst affected was
TEPCO’s (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant which managed
to resist the consequences of the earthquake by successfully shutting down all
operating units.13 However, the ensuing tsunami led to the loss of power supply
which subsequently obstructed the cooling of the three reactors at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear plant.14 Only one emergency diesel generator (6B) remained intact
and it ‘‘provided emergency power for the units 5 and 6’’.15 Moreover, the
instrumentation and control systems were also disabled by the tsunami, rendering
repair work almost impossible. The absence of the cooling system quickly led to
an explosion on site; the spent fuel pools began to leak and the radiological
contamination spread into the environment.16 Japan faced an unprecedented nuclear
accident that was rated 7 on the INES scale.17
ii. the convention on nuclear safety
The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in Vienna in 1994, eight years after
the Chernobyl accident.18 It was the result of growing concern over the operation of
8. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Japan: Earthquake & Tsunami, Situation
Report No. 7 (18 March 2011), online: OCHA /http://reliefweb.intS.
9. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Fukushima Accident 2011’’ (November 2011), online: WNA /http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/fukushima_accident_inf129.htmlS.
10. IAEA, ‘‘Report of Japanese Government to IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety—Accident
at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations’’ (7 June 2011), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report/S [Report of Japanese Government]. According to this
report, the tsunami caused the inundation of 561km2 of land and the destruction of 475,000 residential
buildings. Approximately 460,000 households suffered from gas supply shortages, approximately
4,000,000 households lost electricity and almost all phone lines were down.
11. International Food Safety Authorities Network, ‘‘Information on Nuclear Accidents and Radioactive
Contamination of Foods’’ (30 March 2011), online: INFOSAN /http://www.fao.orgS.
12. See supra note 1 at 2.
13. Fukushima Dai-ni 1, 2, 3, 4, Tohoku’s Onagawa 1, 2, 3, and Japco’s Tokai operating units were also
successfully shut down.
14. Three other reactors that did not melt are now in cold shutdown.
15. Supra note 1 at 2.
16. See Mark J. RAMSEYER, ‘‘Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of
Japan’’ (2012) 13 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 457.
17. See ‘‘How Does Fukushima Differ From Chernobyl’’ BBC (16 December 2011), online: BBC /http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13050228S. So far 370,000 terabecquerels (as of 12 April) of
radiation were realized. At Chernobyl 5.2 million terabecquerels were realized.
18. See NSC, supra note 4.
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‘‘Chernobyl-type graphite reactors that continue to operate not only in Ukraine but also
in Russia and Lithuania’’.19 It is considered to be an ‘‘incentive convention’’ prescribing
general safety rules without directly interfering in the competence of the national
regulatory bodies. This is underlined in its Preamble, which states that the ‘‘Convention
entails a commitment to the application of fundamental safety principles for nuclear
installations rather than of detailed safety standards’’.20 As is the case with many
other conventions regulating civilian nuclear energy,21 the rules of the NSC are
heavily based ‘‘on the technical standards contained in the Safety Fundamentals by the
IAEA in 1993’’.22 Although these standards23 are not considered to be binding
and the NSC does not explicitly refer to them, some authors still believe states
must comply with the standards since ‘‘they had undoubted influence on the regulation
of nuclear risks at the national level and regulating nuclear facilities’’.24 The main
objective of NSC is ‘‘to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide
through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation
including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation’’.25 Since IAEA
standards provide a detailed account of measures aimed at fulfilling this objective, they
need to be relied upon in interpreting and implementing the NSC provisions.26 These
standards also provide indispensable guidance for states in complying with the
convention, which requires prescribing of national safety standards. They also represent
‘‘an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting
people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation’’.27 Due to
all these reasons, they will be taken into consideration in assessing Japan’s compliance
with the NSC.
The NSC requires each contracting party to ‘‘take the appropriate steps to
ensure the safety of nuclear installations’’,28 which necessitates that a country fulfils
several obligations. The word ‘‘appropriate’’ may seem to be an unclear and rather
19. Menno KAMMINGA, ‘‘The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety’’ (1995) 44 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 872 at 875.
20. NSC, supra note 4.
21. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, 5 September 1997 (entered into force 18 June 2001), online: IAEA /http://
www.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/regcontrol/refs/13jointconv.pdfS.
22. Kamminga, supra note 19 at 875.
23. See IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards: The Global Reference for Protecting People and the Environment
from Harmful Effects of Ionizing Radiation’’ (June 2009), online: IAEA /http://www-ns.iaea.org/
downloads/standards/iaea-safety-standards-brochure.pdfS. Depending on the safety matter, the IAEA
differentiates three categories of Safety Standards covering different issues in relation to this type of
radiation: (1) the Safety Fundamental prescribing the main safety and protection objectives, (2) the
Safety Requirements to be fulfilled by a country for the ‘‘protection of the people and environment both
now and in future’’ which are divided into general safety and specific safety requirements, and (3) the
safety guides which provide ‘‘recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the safety
requirements’’.
24. Patricia BIRNIE, Alan BOYLE, and Catherine REDGWELL, International Law & The Environment,
3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 49526.
25. NSC, supra note 4, art. 1(i).
26. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24 at 497.
27. IAEA, ‘‘Factsheets & FAQs: Nuclear Safety’’ (16 June 2011), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Factsheets/English/ns.htmlS.
28. NSC, supra note 4, art. 6.
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unfortunate choice of word but the NSC represents a reflection of ‘‘internationally
formulated safety guidelines’’29 which may change as safety standards evolve.30
A contracting party shall, as its first obligation, ‘‘establish and maintain a legislative
and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations’’31 which is
intended to cover the plant, equipment, materials, and personnel. The IAEA Safety
Guide on the Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety32 provides
a comprehensive checklist of issues to be prescribed by national legislation33 and a list
of competences and functions to be entrusted to the regulatory body.
The second obligation for a contracting party relates to the regulatory body
‘‘entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework’’,34
which includes the following four main activities: (1) authorization, (2) review and
assessment, (3) inspection, and (4) enforcement. The regulatory body must not
be charged with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.35 Bearing in mind
that the variety of issues to be regulated in the domain of civilian nuclear energy
covers several multifunctional areas, the IAEA guide on the Governmental, Legal
and Regulatory Framework for Safety encourages national regulatory bodies to
co-operate with other relevant authorities:
The regulatory body shall make arrangements for analysis to be carried out to identify
lessons to be learned from operating experience and regulatory experience, including
29. Kamminga, supra note 19 at 875.
30. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24 at 501.
31. NSC, supra note 4, art. 7(1).
32. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Governmental, Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Safety’’, No. GS-R-1 (September 2010), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.
iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1465_web.pdfS.
33. Ibid., at 526. The checklist of issues to be prescribed includes the following:
1. The safety principles for protecting people—individually and collectively—society and the
environment from radiation risks, both at present and in the future;
2. The types of facilities and activities that are included within the scope of the framework for safety;
3. The type of authorization that is required for the operation of facilities and for the conduct of
activities, in accordance with a graded approach;
4. The rationale for the authorization of new facilities and activities, as well as the applicable
decision making process;
5. Provision for the involvement of interested parties and for their input to decision making;
6. Provision for assigning legal responsibility for safety to the persons or organizations responsible
for the facilities and activities, and for ensuring the continuity of responsibility where activities
are carried out by several persons or organizations successively;
7. The establishment of a regulatory body, as addressed in Requirements 3 and 4;
8. Provision for the review and assessment of facilities and activities, in accordance with a graded
approach;
9. The authority and responsibility of the regulatory body for promulgating (or preparing for the
enactment of) regulations and preparing guidance for their implementation;
10. Provision for the inspection of facilities and activities, and for the enforcement of regulations, in
accordance with a graded approach;
11. Provision for appeals against decisions of the regulatory body;
12. Provision for preparedness for, and response to, a nuclear or radiological emergency;
13. Provision for an interface with nuclear security;
14. Provision for an interface with the system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material.
34. NSC, supra note 4, art. 8(1).
35. Ibid., art. 8(2).
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experience in other States, and for the dissemination of the lessons learned and for their
use by authorized parties, the regulatory body and other relevant authorities.36
It is also worth mentioning the IAEA safety guide on the Organisation and Staffing of
the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities,37 which provides recommendations for
national authorities regarding the management and the organization of a national
regulatory body.
Under the NSC general safety requirements, the contracting parties shall take
appropriate steps to ensure the priority of safety,38 adequate financial and human
resources,39 limitations of human performance,40 quality assurance,41 assessment and
verification of safety,42 radiation protection,43 and emergency preparedness and
response.44 Taking into account the events that occurred prior and subsequent to the
Fukushima accident, as well as the fact that the ‘‘prime responsibility for the safety of
a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence’’,45 provisions
related to adequate resources, quality assurance, and emergency preparedness and
response will be discussed in more detail.
The requirement to ensure adequate human resources involves the ‘‘provision of
sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining
for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life’’.46 In
the light of the IAEA standards, the personnel should possess capabilities and
competences for all aspects of plant operation.47 The obligation also entails their
attitudes towards the safe functioning of the plant.48 Operational safety is closely
connected with the safety culture within a nuclear installation. Additionally, the IAEA
published a safety standard on the Recruitment, Qualification and Training of Personnel
for Nuclear Power Plants,49 which lays out factors to be taken into account in ensuring
effective and well-trained personnel within the plant. Safety culture is an additional
safety requirement that is understood both as the obligation of a contracting party to
ensure the priority of safety and as the obligation to ensure adequate human resources.
The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles interpret this prerequisite as the:
[I]ndividual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the
management and personnel at all levels; accountability of organisations and of
36. See supra note 32 at 16.
37. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear
Facilities’’, No. GS-G-1.1 (August 2002), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
38. NSC, supra note 4, art. 10.
39. NSC, ibid., art. 11.
40. NSC, ibid., art. 12.
41. NSC, ibid., art. 13.
42. NSC, ibid., art. 14.
43. NSC, ibid., art. 15.
44. NSC, ibid., art. 16.
45. NSC, ibid., art. 9.
46. NSC, ibid., art. 11(2).
47. IAEA, ‘‘Promoting Safety in Nuclear Installations’’, 2003, online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.orgS.
48. Ibid.
49. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Recruitment, Qualification and Training of Personnel for
Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-2.8 (November 2002), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
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individuals at all levels for safety; and measures to encourage a questioning and learning
attitude and to discourage complacency with regard to safety.50
No less important is the obligation of quality assurance that includes both the safety
assessment before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and
throughout its life; as well as the regular analysis, surveillance, testing, and inspection of
the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation.51
The obligation of emergency preparedness and response is one of the issues that
was much discussed after the Fukushima accident. Under the Convention, each
contracting party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that there are ‘‘on-site and
off-site emergency plans which are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover
the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency’’.52 The contracting party
should also provide information for emergency planning and response to its own
population and the competent authorities of the states in the vicinity of the nuclear
installation.53 In March 2002, the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved the safety
standards on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency,
which ‘‘established the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and
response to a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State’’.54 Moreover, in 2007
the IAEA additionally published the safety guide on Arrangements for Preparedness
and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency which should assist Member
States in the application of the requirements on preparedness and response to a
nuclear or radiological emergency,55 as well as the Criteria for Use in Preparedness
and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, which provides generic
criteria for preventive actions and other response actions.56
Apart from these general safety requirements,57 the NSC provides more detailed
safety rules concerning the siting,58 design and construction,59 and operation60 of
installations. These rules on the safety of installations represent a major component of
the NSC. Stricter rules apply to existing nuclear plants where ‘‘each contracting party
shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations y is
50. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Fundamental Safety
Principles’’, No. SF-1 (November 2006), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
51. See IAEA, ‘‘Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Installations:
Code and Safety Guides Q1-Q14’’ (September 1996), online: IAEA /http://www.lei.lt/insc/quality/
PDF-Files/SS-50-C-SG-Q-CD.pdfS.
52. NSC, supra note 4, art. 16(1).
53. Ibid., art. 16(2).
54. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency’’, No. GS-R-2 (November 2002), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
55. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Arrangements for
Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency’’, No. GS-G-2.1 (May 2007),
online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
56. IAEA, ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Criteria for Use in
Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency’’, No. GSG-2 (May 2011), online:
IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS.
57. NSC, supra note 4, arts. 10–16.
58. NSC, ibid., art. 17.
59. NSC, ibid., art. 18.
60. NSC, ibid., art. 19.
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reviewed as soon as possible’’.61 The obligation will include, if possible, all reasonably
practicable improvements and the shutdown of the plant if upgrading is not possible.62
Concerning the siting, design, and operation, the IAEA provided states with numerous
safety standards which ‘‘have been very influential and serve as important guidelines for
most states in regulating their nuclear facilities’’.63 Those specific safety standards have
been further clarified and described in several safety guides,64 which apply both to existing
(at the time when the Convention entered into force) and new power plants.
Unlike many other conventions, which have certain non-compliance mechanisms,65
the NSC relies solely on review of national reports at periodic review meetings of
contracting parties in order to resolve safety problems.66 This raises questions about its
efficient enforcement. Moreover, review is not carried out by independent experts as
was recommended by the IAEA’s own International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group,
but by state officials. According to Kamminga ‘‘the Convention thereby fails to reflect
the basic recommendation made by the IAEA’s own International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (INSAG) that the reviewers should be internationally recognized
experts who are independent from the organisations directly responsible for the
management of national nuclear safety programmes’’.67
61. NSC, ibid., art. 6.
62. Ibid.
63. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24 at 496.
64. See e.g. IAEA online publications at /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS: ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: The
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants—Design’’, No. NS-R-1 (September 2000) [Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants—Design]; ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: The Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations’’, No.
NS-R-3 (November 2003) [Site Evaluation for Nuclear Facilities]; ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for
Protecting People and the Environment: Safety of Nuclear Power Plants—Commissioning and
Operation’’, No. SSR-2/2 (July 2011); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Design of Reactor Containment
Systems for Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.10 (September 2004) [Design of Reactor Containment
Systems]; ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Protection Against
Internal Hazards Other than Fires and Explosions in the Design of Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-
1.11 (September 2004); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Design of
the Reactor Core for Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.12 (April 2005) [Design of the Reactor
Core]; ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in
Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.3 (March 2002); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Design of Fuel
Handling and Storage Systems for Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.4 (August 2003); ‘‘IAEA Safety
Standards Series: External Events Excluding Earthquakes in the Design of Nuclear Power Plants’’, No.
NS-G-1.5 (November 2003); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Seismic Design and Qualification for
Nuclear Power Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.6 (November 2003); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards Series: Design of
Emergency Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, No. NS-G-1.8 (August 2004); ‘‘IAEA Safety
Standards Series: Design of the Reactor Coolant System and Associated Systems in Nuclear Power
Plants’’, No. NS-G-1.9 (September 2004) [Design of the Reactor Coolant System]; ‘‘IAEA Safety
Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Evaluation of Seismic Safety for Existing
Nuclear Installations’’, No. NS-G-2.13 (May 2009); ‘‘IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and
the Environment: Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations’’, No. SSG-9 (August
2010).
65. E.g. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989) [Montreal Protocol]; Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
28 June 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force 30 October 2001) [Aarhus Convention]; and the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997
(entered into force 16 February 2005), online: UNFCC /http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdfS [Kyoto Protocol]. See Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24.
66. NSC, supra note 4, art. 5.
67. Kamminga, supra note 19 at 880.
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iii. implementation of the convention on nuclear
safety and iaea standards in japan
The Fukushima nuclear accident called for a re-examination of the safety rules
prescribed by the NSC, as well as the safety standards developed by the IAEA. As the
circumstances surrounding the catastrophe slowly come to light, it is worth analyzing
the measures taken by the Japanese government to apply the NSC in order to assess
its compliance with the Convention; notably the steps undertaken to implement
certain NSC provisions concerning the regulatory body, safety culture, siting, design,
and construction of the plant.68 Although the NSC ‘‘seeks to pursue its objectives
by enhancing national measures’’,69 the obligations embodied in the Convention,
together with the IAEA’s standards, provide sufficient guidance concerning the types
of measures that need to be adopted. Moreover, the failure to adopt certain national
measures may raise a question about the violation of the international obligation
contained in the NSC.
A. Was NISA an Independent and Efficient Regulatory Body?
Under the NSC, each contracting party shall establish or designate a regulatory body,
entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework,
which will be independent from the body entrusted with the promotion of nuclear
energy.70 The establishment of such regulatory body both de jure and de facto has
proven to be a difficult challenge for almost all contracting parties. Hence, the issue
was discussed at several review meetings concerning the implementation of the NSC,
especially at the third review meeting where the governments raised serious concerns
regarding the independence and capabilities of national regulatory bodies in the light
of austerity measures worldwide.71
Following the reorganization of the Japanese central government in 2001, the
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) was given responsibility for
the safety regulation of all nuclear energy facilities, while the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was established as a special organization integrated
within METI72 entrusted with the administration of nuclear safety regulations.
Besides NISA, there were several other bodies with various competences within
the field of nuclear energy: the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Atomic
Energy Commission, both within the Prime Minister’s Office.73 The Japan
68. There were concerns after the Fukushima accident regarding the implementation of the NSC
provisions on the legislative and regulatory framework, human resources, and emergency preparedness.
However, the author decided to analyze only the most evident deficiencies in the implementation
of the NSC.
69. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24 at 501.
70. NSC, supra note 4, art. 8(1)–(2).
71. IAEA, ‘‘Summary Report of the Third Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety’’ (April 2005), online: IAEA /http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/safety_convention/
conv-2005.pdfS.
72. Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety—National Report of Japan for the
Second Review Meeting’’ (October 2001), online: NSR /http://www.nsr.go.jpS at 8.1.
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rev i s i t ing the convent ion on nuclear safe ty 373
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization was created in 2003 under the auspices
of METI to provide infrastructure together with NISA to ensure the safe use of
nuclear energy.74
Even before the Fukushima accident there were serious concerns about the
independence and efficiency of NISA and these became more pronounced and
articulated following the catastrophe, especially through media coverage.75 Moreover,
these concerns raised the question of the compliance of the Japanese government with
Article 8 of the NSC, which governs the establishment and competences of the national
regulatory body, and the safety requirements prescribed by the IAEA safety guide on
Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities.76
Under Article 20 of the Act for Establishment of the METI,77 NISA was exclusively
in charge of ensuring ‘‘safety of nuclear and other energies and industrial safety’’.78
The Japanese national reports on the implementation of the NSC underlined the
competences of NISA, which are intended to guarantee its independence and do not
include the promotion of nuclear energy.79 However, in several instances NISAwas not
only performing these tasks but was also engaged in the promotion of nuclear energy.80
This practice also raises the question of a potential conflict of interest in NISA’s work as
a result of its competence to monitor the implementation of safety rules and its interest
in promoting the use of nuclear energy in Japan. NISA’s independence from the body
promoting nuclear energy was additionally questionable due to the fact that NISAwas
an ‘‘agency of METI, the ministry in charge of promotion of nuclear energy’’.81 The Act
for Establishment of the METI entrusts another METI agency, the Agency of Natural
Resources and Energy, with the ‘‘promotion of appropriate utilisation of mineral
resources and energy’’.82 This demonstrates the lack of proper separation of powers
when it concerns the promotion of nuclear energy and the breach of the obligation
prescribed by Article 8 of the NSC.
The effective delegation of powers to NISA is another issue to be addressed.
It essentially requires ‘‘the delegation of regulatory powers to some agency distinct
74. Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety—National Report of Japan for the
Fourth Review Meeting’’ (September 2007), online: NSR /http://www.nsr.go.jpS at 8.1.
75. See, for instance, ‘‘Japan Sacks Three Nuclear Power Officials in Shake-up’’ BBC (4 August 2011),
online: BBC /http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14398645S, and ‘‘‘Nuclear Safety
Agency’ is Patchwork Without Policy Change’’ Japan Press Weekly (3 August 2011), online: Japan
Press Weekly /http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php?id52103S.
76. Supra note 37.
77. See infra note 82 at A.324.
78. Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety—National Report of Japan for the Fifth
Review Meeting’’ (September 2010), online: NSR /http://www.nsr.go.jpS at 42.
79. See infra note 82 at 8.3, and supra note 74 at 8.1.
80. There were several incidents where NISA requested electric power companies to arrange pro-nuclear
energy questions during seminars organized by the government. See e.g. ‘‘NISA Asked Chubu Electric
to Manipulate Public Opinion’’ Asahi Shimbun (29 July 2011), online: /http://ajw.asahi.com/article/
0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201107295038S.
81. AOKI Masahiko and Geoffrey ROTHWELL, ‘‘Coordination Under Large Uncertainty: An Analysis of
the Fukushima Catastrophe’’, Social Science Research Network, Stanford University, Working Paper,
15 October 2011 at 12.
82. Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety—National Report of Japan for the
Third Review Meeting’’ (October 2001), online: NSR /http://www.nsr.go.jpS at 8.3.
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from the government itself’’.83 This requirement stems also from the obligation of a
country to ‘‘establish a regulatory authority provided with adequate authority,
competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities’’.84
According to Majone, this is a feature of modern public administration where the ‘‘rules
are made and enforced by expert agencies operating at arm’s length from government’’.85
However, in the case of NISA and METI, the Minister of METI has, inter alia, the
authority to issue licences for the establishment of the nuclear installations and revoke
them in cases of violations of the Reactor Regulation Act. The Minister may also pass
ordinances on operational safety, technical standards, operation plans, and pre-service
inspection,86 while NISA at the time conducted ‘‘clerical works concerning the
competence of the Minister of METI’’.87 This runs counter to the IAEA’s requirements
on legislative aspects of regulatory independence, which empower a ‘‘regulatory body to
have the authority to take decisions, including decisions on enforcement actions’’.88
The other concern relates to the inefficiency of NISA in performing its duties,
especially in overseeing the state of nuclear installations. In various national reports
on the implementation of the NSC, the Japanese government explained NISA’s
response to certain incidents that occurred in nuclear power plants. Unfortunately, in
most of the cases the response was belated and demonstrated a lack of trained staff
within NISA and a lack of openness, raising concerns about the implementation
of Article 11 of the NSC. The obligation of efficiency of the regulatory body in
discharging its responsibilities and performing its functions was clarified by the
IAEA’s general safety requirements, which precisely entail the promotion of
enhancements in safety, and the fulfilment of its obligations in an appropriate,
timely, and cost-effective manner so as to build confidence.89
TEPCO’s falsification of self-controlled inspection records represents a very good
illustration of NISA’s inefficiency. In 2000, METI obtained information about
falsified records and, immediately after the creation of NISA, entrusted it with the
task of verifying these allegations.90 Unfortunately, the records were not kept after a
certain period of time and NISA’s employees were unable to act promptly. Even
though one may argue that NISA was a new institution within METI, the question
remains as to why it took two years for NISA to disclose this information to the
public.91 The inefficiency of NISA was also evident during the Fukushima accident
when this regulatory body demonstrated its inability to act in an emergency
situation. The interim report of the independent investigation into the Fukushima
disaster, led by Professor Hatamura Yotaro, concluded that NISA did not possess
83. Giandomenico MAJONE, ‘‘The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory Institutions
in the European Union’’ (1997) 3 EIPASCOPE 1 at 126.
84. NSC, supra note 4, art. 8(1).
85. Supra note 83 at 1.
86. Supra note 82 at 8.2.
87. Ibid.
88. Supra note 37 at 4.
89. Supra note 32 at 20.
90. Supra note 82 at Preface-3.
91. Ibid.
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sufficient organizational capabilities and expert knowledge to deal with the
consequences of the disaster and that it demonstrated a lack of transparency and
independence in its actions,92 which prompted the committee to recommend the
strengthening of the regulatory body in its final report.93 A good illustration is the
failure of NISA to provide the SPEEDI (The System for Prediction of Environmental
Emergency Dose Information) results to the public, which was an essential element in
planning the prevention of radiation exposure and the evacuation of the local
population.94 A more demonstrative example is the failure of NISA to act upon
TEPCO’s safety evaluation report on the impact of a tsunami on the nuclear
installation. This is examined below in relation to the implementation of the NSC
provision on siting, design, and construction.
Doubts in relation to the establishment and functioning of NISAwere expressed in a
series of reports after the accident, which clearly demonstrates Japan’s failure to
comply with the NSC’s obligation on the regulatory body. The Integrated Regulatory
Review Service (IRRS) of the IAEA raised this concern in 2007 and made several
recommendations to the Japanese government that were, unfortunately, not taken into
account at the time.95 A more critical assessment was contained in the Diet’s report,
where it was concluded that the ‘‘independence of the regulatory body from the
political arena, the ministries promoting nuclear energy, and the operators was
a mockery’’.96 The Commission stated that NISA lacked expertise, openness in
decision-making, and commitment to ensuring safety. The Japanese government, in its
report on the Fukushima accident, announced that there was a need to reinforce the
safety regulatory bodies by separating NISA from METI and to review implementing
frameworks, including the NSC and relevant ministries.97 Media coverage suggested
that NISAwould be incorporated within the Ministry of Environment. This was finally
carried out on 19 September 2012 with the establishment of the Nuclear Regulation
Authority. This body replaced NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission and
constitutes a part of the Ministry of Environment. Time will show if this represents an
adequate solution as a result of the ministry’s competences in the promotion of clean
energy, such as nuclear energy.98 An additional challenge is the fact that the initial plan
92. Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric
Power Company, ‘‘Interim Report’’ (26 December 2011), online: ICANPS /http://icanps.go.jp/eng/
interim-report.htmlS.
93. Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric
Power Company, ‘‘Final Report on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo
Electric Power Company—Recommendations’’ (23 July 2012), online: ICANPS /http://icanps.go.jpS
at 10. Seven main recommendations were made in the Final Report: (1) the need for independence and
transparency; (2) organizational preparedness for swift and effective emergency response;
(3) recognition of its role as a provider of disaster-related information to Japan and the world;
(4) development of competent human resources and specialized expertise; (5) efforts to collect
information and acquire scientific knowledge; (6) active relationship with international organizations
and regulatory bodies of other countries; and (7) strengthening of the regulatory body.
94. Supra note 92 at 297.
95. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety—National Report of Japan
for the Second Extraordinary Meeting’’ (July 2012), online: METI /http://www.meti.go.jpS at 27.
96. Supra note 3 at 20.
97. See Report of Japanese Government, supra note 10.
98. See supra note 75.
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to phase out the use of nuclear energy by 2040 failed to receive the full support of the
Japanese cabinet.99
B. Safety Culture in the Nuclear Power Industry in Japan
The issue of safety culture100 was often on the agenda of meetings of the contracting
parties to the NSC.101 This component is considered to be essential for the proper
implementation of the NSC provisions since it represents a precondition for the
preparation and review of NSC safety standards within both the operating organization
and the regulatory body. As it is emphasized by the IAEA guide on the Management
System for Facilities and Activities safety requirements, the ‘‘management safety
standards, incorporated into national legislation and regulations and supplemented by
international conventions and detailed national requirements, establish a basis for
protecting people and the environment’’.102
Even before the accident there were certain concerns about the lack of a safety culture
within the operating organizations and national regulatory body in Japan.103 Certain
alarming allegations made in relation to TEPCO demonstrated not only the complete lack
of a safety culture within the operator but a level of incompetence and collusion within the
national regulatory body. Although TEPCO’s falsification of self-controlled inspection
records was certainly one of the most obvious examples, there were several others. One
incident concerned the falsifying of a reactor containment leakage test that occurred in
1991 and 1992 that was revealed as late as 2002. Even more alarming was the fact that
the inspection at the time was attended by inspectors of the national regulatory body.104
Although the Japanese government, in its second national report of 2001, admitted
that there was a need to reassess the management safety issue, it tried to justify the
actions of the regulatory body with the ‘‘ambiguity of regulatory procedure on
self-controlled inspection by license holders, lack of formulated acceptance criteria of
cracks, and insufficient penalty for organizational illegal acts’’.105 This explanation is
indicative of the failure of the Japanese government not only to establish and maintain a
legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations as is
prescribed by Article 7 of the NSC but also shows a lack of a safety culture. This
criticism was finally confirmed in the Diet’s report where the Independent Investigation
Commission characterized the ‘‘cosy relationship between the operators, the regulators
and academic scholars as totally inappropriate’’ and found that ‘‘it was far from being a
99. Jonathan SOBLE, ‘‘Doubts Rise on Japan’s Nuclear Phase-out’’ Financial Times (19 September 2012),
online /http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccb75eb0-0268-11e2-8cf8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2GLZmHIirS.
100. See supra note 50 at 8. It is defined as a culture that ‘‘governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to
safety of all organizations and individuals concerned [and which] must be integrated in the
management system’’.
101. See supra note 6.
102. IAEA, ‘‘Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: The Management System for
Facilities and Activities’’, No. GS-R-3 (July 2006), online: IAEA /http://www-pub.iaea.orgS at 12.
103. This issue was extensively discussed in the media. See Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center, ‘‘‘Not
Again’: Yet another TEPCO Scandal’’ (March/April 2007), online: CINC /http://cnic.jpS.
104. Supra note 82 at 6.2.
105. Ibid at Preface-4.
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safety culture’’ with frequent lobbying by the Federation of Electric Power
Companies.106 The Diet concluded by calling it ‘‘a regulatory capture in which the
oversight of the industry by regulators effectively ceases’’.107
C. Were There any Deficiencies Related to the Siting, Design, and
Construction of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant?
Regarding new power plants, the NSC requires each contracting state to ‘‘take
appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are implemented concerning the
siting, design and construction and operation of the nuclear plant’’.108 As for existing
power plants, the contracting parties shall take measures to carry out all practical
improvements to upgrade the plants or, if not possible, to shut them down.109 Although
the NSC does not contain detailed obligations concerning the siting of a nuclear power
installation, there are certain IAEA general and specific requirements for contracting
parties to take into consideration. Since the Fukushima nuclear power plant dates from
1971, the rules on existing nuclear power plants apply first. However, the assessment of
the existing plants also requires a contracting party to comply with all recent IAEA
safety requirements, which are the results of evolving safety standards concerning the
use of nuclear energy. Moreover, the assessment should be in the ‘‘form of critical self-
assessments with outside assistance, peer reviews, or in-depth evaluations involving
experts from other countries or international bodies’’.110
1. Siting of the plant
One of the obligations laid down by the Convention requires a party to evaluate all
relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its
projected lifetime.111 The choice of siting for any plant in Japan requires a very strict
evaluation of the seismological and geological conditions in the region, as well as the
engineering geological aspects and geotechnical aspects of the proposed site, as a
consequence of Japan’s geological structure. Japan represents a ‘‘weak and unstable
segment of the earth’s crust where readjustments of deep-lying rock masses are
constantly occurring, resulting in hundreds of volcanoes and more than 1500
earthquakes shocks occurring annually’’.112 Moreover, being situated at the
‘‘boundaries of four tectonic plates: the North American, Eurasian, Pacific and
Philippine Sea plates, the Japanese archipelago receives strong compression from two
directions caused by subductions of the Pacific and Philippine Sea plates’’.113
106. Supra note 3 at 43.
107. Ibid.
108. NSC, supra note 4, arts. 17219.
109. Ibid., art. 6.
110. IAEA, ‘‘Summary Report of the 1st Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety’’ (12223 April 1999), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.orgS at para. 28.
111. NSC, supra note 4, art. 17.
112. Glenn T. TREWARTHA, Japan—A Geography (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press;
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1970) at 17.
113. See supra note 10 at III-1.
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As a result, the siting phase should involve the assessment of these external
occurrences, primarily the impact of earthquakes and tsunamis occurring in the region.
These requirements should also be applied when the conditions on design and
construction were assessed and reassessed for existing nuclear installations. According
to the IAEA’s specific standards on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, the country
should first ‘‘collect pre-historical, historical and instrumentally recorded information
and records, as applicable, of the occurrences and severity of important natural
phenomena activities for the region that will be carefully analyzed for reliability,
accuracy and completeness’’.114 A country should also assess the frequency and severity
of any naturally induced event and phenomenon that could impact the safety of the
plant.115 In the case of countries such as Japan, the IAEA’s specific site standards require
not only the assessment of seismological and geological conditions in the region but also
the phenomenon of water waves induced by earthquakes or other geological
phenomena.116 This involves evaluating the potential effect of tsunamis on the safety
of a nuclear installation site, as these are a combination of geological and
meteorological natural hazards and these represent separate natural phenomena. The
fact that the contingency of a severe combination of external events was not anticipated
in the design, operation, resourcing, and emergency arrangements was also criticized by
the IAEA in its preliminary report subsequent to the Fukushima accident.117 As will be
shown below, both the regulatory body and the operator were also aware of the fact
that the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was not capable of withstanding the effects
of the earthquake and the tsunami but tacitly approved of the existing situation.118
The frequency of earthquakes in Japan led to the development of an extensive
legislative framework and methodology governing seismic impacts on the siting and
design of nuclear power plants. The Japan Meteorological Agency even developed its
own seismic scale, known as the JMA Seismic Intensity Scale.119 The Environmental
Impact Assessment Act, the Reactor Regulation Law, and the Regulatory Guide for
Reviewing Nuclear Reactor Siting Evaluation and Application Criteria are the main
pieces of legislation governing the evaluation of all site-related factors.120 However, in
its preliminary report of June 2011, the IAEA reported that ‘‘Japan underestimated
the tsunami hazard for several sites y Nuclear designers and operators should
appropriately evaluate and provide protection against the risks of all natural hazards,
and should periodically update these assessments and assessment methodologies in
light of new information, experience and understanding.’’121 While the IAEA primarily
114. See Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, supra note 64 at 7.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., at 13.
117. Supra note 1 at 4.
118. See supra note 3.
119. See Japan Meteorological Agency, ‘‘Tables Explaining the JMA Seismic Intensity Scale’’ (2012),
online: JMA /http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/Activities/inttable.htmlS.
120. Supra note 82 at A3281. The Japanese Regulatory Guide for Safety Design prescribes that structures,
systems, and components with safety functions shall be designed to sufficiently withstand appropriate
design basis seismic forces.
121. Supra note 1 at 4.
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criticized the estimation of a possible tsunami, there were also some concerns
regarding defence against earthquakes.122 These concerns question the compliance with
the NSC provisions on siting and the applicable IAEA standards.
The Fukushima nuclear plant is located in the Fukushima prefecture that lies
in the Tohoku Region of Honshu Island. It is a region that has frequently been
affected by large tsunamis123 and has also experienced major earthquakes followed
by tsunamis that struck the Sanriku coast in 1896 and 1933. The reactors in the
Fukushima plant were designed to withstand an earthquake up to magnitude 7.9 and
tsunami waves of up to 5.7 metres. All the eleven reactors at four affected nuclear
power plants operating at the time in the region shut down automatically when the
earthquake occurred.
Despite the fact that the defence system against the earthquake did work in this
instance, there are concerns about the methodology used for calculating the effects of
the earthquakes. According to Geller, the estimation of earthquakes is based on flawed
methods for long-term forecasts which follow the seismic-gap hypothesis conjectures
that ‘‘zones where no large earthquakes have occurred for a while, dubbed ‘seismic
gaps’, are ripe for imminent large events’’.124 By using this methodology, it was
calculated that three regions—Tokai, Tonankai, and Nankai—represent the most
dangerous zones of three hypothetical ‘‘scenario earthquakes’’.125 The same conclusion
was reiterated in the Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA—
Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations.126 However, in the last
100 years no earthquakes occurred in any of these regions, but they have occurred in
places designated as low probability regions. Geller adds that the right approach should
have also factored in global seismicity and the historical record in Tohoku in estimating
seismic hazards and gives examples of ‘‘five subduction-zone earthquakes of magnitude
9.0 or greater (Kamchatka 1952, Chile 1960, Alaska 1964, Sumatra 2004, Tohoku
2011)’’.127 In addition, the earthquakes with tsunamis that struck the Sanriku coast in
1896 and 1933 show the same pattern in Japan.
More worrying findings were presented in the Diet’s report, which demonstrated
NISA’s and TEPCO’s knowledge of weak plant structure that was unable to withstand a
powerful earthquake.128 NISA accepted TEPCO’s interim anti-seismic back check
report although ‘‘the scope of the assessment included the reactor building and only
seven of many other important safety installations and equipment’’.129 The report was a
response to the Nuclear Safety Commission guidelines and showed a need for many
reinforcements to meet the standards of the new guidelines. Despite this finding, NISA
subsequently approved the postponement of any future seismic checks until 2016.
122. See Robert J. GELLER, ‘‘Shake-up Time for Japanese Seismology’’ (2011) 472 Nature 407.
123. Ibid., at 408.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. See Report of Japanese Government, supra note 10.
127. Geller, supra note 122 at 408.
128. Supra note 3 at 27.
129. Ibid.
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With regard to the tsunami defence system, Geller points at the historical records
for tsunamis, namely the ‘‘well-documented 1896 Sanriku tsunami with a maximum
height of 38 metres causing more than 22,000 deaths and the 1869 Jogan tsunami
documented to have had a height roughly comparable to, or perhaps slightly less
than, that of the 11 March tsunami’’.130 Bearing in mind the obligation of a country
to collect pre-historical, historical, and instrumentally recorded information and
records, failure to act upon this knowledge would certainly alter the chain of events
in the Fukushima case. Moreover, the responsible regulatory bodies also failed to
properly organize the planning process in several instances when tsunami impact was
assessed. In 2001, the Nuclear Safety Commission commenced the ‘‘revision process
of the seismic design regulatory guide through its Sub-committee but no tsunami
specialist was included’’; this demonstrated a lack of awareness of the significance of
tsunamis in nuclear safety.131 Furthermore, after receiving TEPCO’s safety evaluation
report based on the ‘‘Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants in
Japan’’, NISA failed to provide specific points or instructions for action.132 This also
occurred in September 2009 and March 2011 when NISA received TEPCO’s results
on evaluating the tsunami impact metrics.133 In addition, the failure to calculate the
accurate height of a potential tsunami also rests with the operator TEPCO. Although
the initial licences for Fukushima Daiichi were ‘‘awarded in 1966 with the design
base of 3.1 meters as the tsunami wave height above the sea level’’,134 subsequent
testing led to the threshold being raised to a height of 5.7 metres.135 In February
2002, the Tsunami Evaluation Subcommittee, established under the Nuclear Civil
Engineering Committee and the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, compiled the
tsunami evaluation methodology for estimating the maximum wave height of a
tsunami based on existing historical records.136 According to this methodology,
TEPCO reassessed potential tsunami impact and concluded that the reactor should
be capable of withstanding the impact of a tsunami exceeding 15metres, but failed to
take any steps in altering the existing line of defence. There were even some concerns
that this methodology was ‘‘decided through an unclear process, and with the
improper involvement of the electric power companies’’, and that NISA accepted it
‘‘without examining its validity’’.137
Not only was the impact of a tsunami badly assessed, but the siting of the plant
was modified to accommodate TEPCO’s needs in the construction phase. Namely,
the natural 35-metre seaside cliff was reduced to 5.7metres, which was considered to
be a sufficient height to withstand the projected force of a tsunami. After the
130. Geller, supra note 122 at 408.
131. Supra note 92 at 586.
132. Ibid., at 587.
133. Ibid.
134. See supra note 92 at 585. According to this report, this height was set based on the maximum wave
height observed at the Onahama Port (about 40 kilometres south of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS) at
the time of the Chile Earthquake in 1960.
135. See supra note 1 at 1.
136. Supra note 92 at 587.
137. Supra note 3 at 2728.
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Fukushima accident there was speculation regarding the reason for lowering the
natural seawall. According to media reports, it was partly done to facilitate the
transport of equipment to the site and the pumping of seawater to the reactors.138
The other reason concerned the potential impact of earthquakes, since it was
estimated that the reduction of the seawall would be an ‘‘efficient way to build the
complex atop the solid base of bedrock needed to better protect the plant from
earthquakes’’.139 Even though this may seem a reasonable decision at the time, it is
evident now that the environmental impact assessment was not properly carried out.
In addition, it raises the question of whether the environmental, seismic, and
meteorological events were properly taken into account, not only during the design
and construction of the plant, but also throughout the life-cycle of the plant.140
As was pointed out in the arbitration proceedings in the Mox Plant Case:
[T]he objectives of a proper environmental assessment are, inter alia, to ensure that the
activities comply with the applicable international environmental obligations, to ensure
that appropriate protective and response measures may be taken, to ensure that alternative
proposals have been fully considered, and to ensure that interested parties and concerned
States are fully informed of the environmental implications of the project.141
Furthermore, this runs counter to the obligation of the party under the NSC to
re-evaluate the likely safety impact of all relevant site-related factors on individuals,
society, and the environment.
2. Design and construction of the plant
There were serious concerns about improvements to the plant that were obliged to be
done in accordance with Article 6 of the NSC concerning existing nuclear installations
and Article 18 concerning the design and construction of the installation. Likewise,
compliance with the relevant IAEA’s standards on power plant design,142 the design of
the reactor coolant system,143 the design of reactor containment systems for nuclear
power plants,144 and the design of the reactor core was also questionable.145 Several
issues were raised by both the international experts and the representatives of the
Japanese government concerning the design and construction of the installation.
Inadequate defence in depth, the design of fuel ponds, the loss of power supply, and an
inadequate cooling system were some of the major deficiencies identified in the design
of the nuclear installation. Moreover, the media again speculated about the failure of
138. See ‘‘Fateful Move Exposed Japan Plant’’ Wall Street Journal (12 July 2011), online /http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303982504576425312941820794.htmlS.
139. Ibid.
140. See Case Concerning the Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7.
See also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 24 at 170.
141. The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Memorial of
Ireland (Segment II) (26 July 2002), online: PCA /http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?
pag_id51148S at para. 7.2.
142. See Safety of Nuclear Power Plants—Design, supra note 64.
143. See Design of the Reactor Coolant System, supra note 64.
144. See Design of Reactor Containment Systems, supra note 64.
145. See Design of the Reactor Core, supra note 64.
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TEPCO to improve Units 1–5 at the Daiichi installation, although General Electric,
which designed the initial boiling water reactors,146 known as the Mark 1 containment,
offered a ‘‘reactor with a sleeker design—the Mark II’’.147 This refusal was considered to
be in gross violation of Article 6 of the NSC, which prescribes the strict obligation of
contracting parties to improve existing nuclear installations.
A major criticism concerns the design of the reactor coolant system, which should, as
prescribed by the NSC, provide reliable levels and methods of protection. This
obligation is further clarified and explained in the IAEA’s standards on Reactor Coolant
System and Associated Systems. This safety guide requires the operator to provide the
appropriate ‘‘emergency power supply as necessary to components that are needed for
system actuation or operation’’.148 Moreover, the ‘‘emergency core cooling system should
be designed to ensure that enough coolant is available for adequate long term core
cooling’’.149 As a rule, the backup power is supplied from on-site emergency diesel
generators that provide electricity. Unfortunately, in the Fukushima accident, the loss of
the backup power system and the flooding of the seawater pumps caused by the tsunami
was the result of an additional design flaw. Since it was estimated that the tsunami waves
would not be higher than 5.7 metres, the seawater pumps and the emergency diesel
generators and switchboards installed in the basement floor of the reactor buildings and
the turbine buildings were placed at heights ranging from 0 to 5.8 metres.150 When the
tsunami struck, except for the one diesel generator in Unit 6 which was placed at a
higher altitude, the rest were immediately submerged. Although the assessment from
2002—based on the Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan
and proposed by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers—showed that the maximum water
level would be 5.7 metres, TEPCO only raised the height of the seawater pump
installation and diesel generators in Unit 6 in response to that assessment.151 The lack of
power supply subsequently led to the overheating of the reactor cores and the spent fuel
pools. Seawater was used as an alternative coolant for the spent fuel pools.
As a result of the failure to implement the defence-in-depth requirement152 prescribed
by Article 1(ii) of the NSC, loss of power supply occurred. Both the report of the IAEA153
and the report of the Japanese government154 identified that defence in depth was not
developed for extreme events such as an earthquake followed by a tsunami. The IAEA
guide on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants—Design155 differentiates five layers of
146. Reactors became operational in the period from 1971 to 1975.
147. See ‘‘Design Flaw Fuelled Nuclear Disaster’’ Wall Street Journal (1 July 2011), online /http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.htmlS.
148. See Design of the Reactor Coolant System, supra note 64 at 7.
149. Ibid., at 37
150. See Report of Japanese Government, supra note 10 at III-33.
151. Ibid., at III-3122.
152. According to the IAEA Safety of Nuclear Power Plants—Design, the concept of defence in depth in
the design of a plant provides a series of levels of defence (inherent features, equipment, and
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defence in depth whereby the fourth level of defence was the weakest in the case of the
Fukushima accident. The fourth level of defence should address ‘‘severe accidents in
which the design basis may be exceeded and to ensure that radioactive releases are kept
as low as practicabley The most important objective of this level is the protection of
the confinement function.’’156 Regrettably, the Fukushima nuclear power plant did not
possess an adequate fourth level and experienced problems in the operability of the
containment venting system in the face of a severe accident. As was stated in the report
of the Japanese government subsequent to the accident, ‘‘the primary containment vessel
(PCV) was not equipped with a filter with sufficient radiation decontamination
capability that will enable ventilation facilities to prevent an explosion in the nuclear
reactor building due to hydrogen leakage from the PCV’’.157 In addition, the water
containing dissolved radioactive materials that were released from inside the Reactor
Pressure Vessel (RPV) leaked into the PCV and accumulated inside the reactor buildings
and the turbine buildings.158 In time, the radioactive water was released into the sea.
The question of cooling and supplying water to the spent fuel pool was also discussed
in relation to the Fukushima power plant design. The accident initiated a re-examination
of the NSC and the IAEA requirements regarding the design of the coolant system for
the spent fuel pools. As was stated at the briefing before the US Senate, ‘‘one of the core
areas of concern and potential future action has to do with backup power with spent
fuel rod pools and in particular with battery power capacity’’159 which needs to be
increased for longer than four or eight hours. This was the battery lifespan in the case of
Fukushima power plant. Finally, the actual location of the spent fuel at the higher part of
the reactor building was another issue to examine in future. It remains to be seen
whether spent fuel pools at ground level would facilitate the response to severe accidents.
During the briefing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
United States Senate, the issues of fuel pools design and the inadequate cooling
system for the pools were raised. This discussion again reiterates the importance of
this safety requirement. According to American nuclear energy experts, one of the
issues to be addressed is the optimization of the ‘‘ways to fill the spent fuel pool and
keep water injected into the reactor vessel to keep the core cool’’.160 The experts also
pointed out the need to reconsider the storage of fuel rods in the pool. They also
recommended that the spent fuel rods stored in pools on site should be ‘‘arranged to
place old, cool fuel rods next to newer hotter rods to prevent hot spots and fires in the
event that the pools lost enough water to cover the rods’’.161 According to the World
Nuclear Association, ‘‘reactor unit ponds (2 & 4) were unusually full’’,162 while the
pond at the Unit 4 also held a full core load of 1,535 fuel assemblies.163
156. Ibid., at 6.
157. See Report of Japanese Government, supra note 10 at 270.
158. Ibid., at 323.
159. See US Senate Briefing, supra note 5 at 21.
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161. Ibid., at 20.
162. See supra note 9.
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D. The Quality of the Emergency Response
The primary state obligation in relation to the emergency response is to ensure that
‘‘on-site and off-site emergency plans are functioning in the case of an emergency’’
and to ‘‘provide its own population and the competent authorities of the States in the
vicinity of the nuclear installation with appropriate information for emergency
planning and response’’.164 The off-site emergency plans that—according to the NSC
and the IAEA Safety Standards on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency—should be prepared and routinely tested did not
adequately function after the accident. The investigation committee identified
several reasons that led to the evacuation of the off-site centre:
[D]ifficulty in assembling its staff members due to damaged transportation
and heavily congested traffic caused by the earthquake; loss of telecommuni-
cation infrastructures, power cut, shortages of food, water and fuel; and
elevated radiation levels in the building which was not equipped with air cleaning
filters.165
Emergency preparedness and response after the accident was rather poor. This
deficiency was identified in the IAEA’s preliminary report after the Fukushima
accident,166 the Additional Report of the Japanese government167 of June 2011, the
interim168 and final report169 of the investigation committee set up by the Japanese
government, and the Diet’s report.170 Both the governmental authorities and
TEPCO’s staff failed to fulfil this obligation in an emergency environment of both
a large-scale natural disaster and a nuclear accident.171 None of these bodies acted as
planned due to the fact that the system was not designed to sustain such extreme
natural circumstances.172
As soon as the state of nuclear emergency was declared, the Prime Minister
established the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERH) and the Local
Nuclear Emergency Response Offices, which experienced serious difficulties in their
work. Communication between the NERH and the local offices, as well as between
the NERH and NISA and other relevant governmental bodies, was impeded due to
the lack of communication tools. Moreover, there were concerns about the
delegation of powers between the NEHR and the local offices.173 The emergency
response was also aggravated by disruption in the official communication flow
164. NSC, supra note 4, art. 16.
165. Supra note 92 at 565.
166. Supra note 1 at 4.
167. See Report of Japanese Government, supra note 10.
168. Supra note 92.
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171. The following governmental bodies were involved in the emergency response: the Prime Minister’s
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters of NISA, and the Local Nuclear Emergency Response team.
172. See supra note 3 at 3326.
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rev i s i t ing the convent ion on nuclear safe ty 385
between TEPCO, NISA, and the Prime Minister’s Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, where TEPCO, contrary to emergency rules, had to simultaneously
inform both bodies.174 Furthermore, information collected by SPEEDI on the
discharge of radioactive materials was neither disclosed to the public nor adequately
utilized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology,
the competent ministry for SPEEDI.175 The absence of this information also
influenced the decision-making process concerning the evacuation of residents.176
The investigation committee set up by the government also highlighted the
insufficient and incomplete information regarding the ‘‘status of the reactor cores,
the critical conditions of Unit 3, and explanations on radiation effects on health such
as ‘No immediate impacts on human health’’’.177 TEPCO’s officials also failed to
provide adequate information about the situation in the nuclear installations.178
Moreover, some senior managers failed to return to Tokyo hours after the earth-
quake occurred.179
Likewise, the information was not provided to the states in the vicinity and the
wider international community was not informed in a timely manner about
the decision of the Japanese government to release contaminated water into the sea.
The notification was sent several minutes after the discharge commenced, while the
embassies of the People’s Republic of China, South Korea, and Russia were informed
of the impact of the discharge two days after the discharge began.180 The other
illustration was the inability of the International Affairs Office of the Policy Planning
and Coordination Division of NISA to promptly inform neighbouring countries on
all the aspects of the nuclear accident due to the fact that it lacked staff in the
Emergency Response Centre (ERC) of METI.181 One could question whether this
may be considered as a breach of an international obligation182 prescribed by the
1986 Early Notification Convention,183 which requires a state party in cases of a
nuclear accident to:
[F]orthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, those
States which are or may be physically affected as specified in Article 1 and the Agency of
the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where
appropriate.184
174. See supra note 3 at 34. The best illustration was the lack of communication regarding the vent in Unit
1 and the injection of seawater.
175. Supra note 92 at 579.
176. Ibid., at 297 and 583.
177. Ibid., at 419.
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182. See 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), art. 12.
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iv. response of the international community to the
fukushima accident
Following the immediate aftermath of the disaster and by the time various
investigation committees gathered necessary information about the accident, the
2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention was held in
August 2012. The objective of the Convention was to ‘‘review and discuss lessons
learned so far from the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,
to review the effectiveness of the provisions of the Convention’’ and to provide
appropriate recommendations.185 The six main issues addressed at the meeting
(which correspond with those raised in this article) concerned external events, design
issues, severe accident management and recovery (on-site), national organizations,
emergency preparedness and response and post-accident management (off-site), and
international co-operation.186
The outcome of the meeting was encouraging and it indicated an international
agreement to revisit the NSC. As a first step, the contracting parties discussed the
proposals to amend several important guidelines such as the Guidelines Regarding
the Review Process Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety,187 Guidelines Regarding
National Reports Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety,188 and the Convention on
Nuclear Safety: Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules.189 Moreover, parties
discussed a set of action-oriented objectives for strengthening nuclear safety based on
the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.190 Those objectives recognized
the need to reinforce compliance with the NSC, especially with regard to the
independence and functioning of national regulatory bodies and the importance of
IAEA standards in complying with the NSC. The contracting parties unequivocally
recommended strengthening the independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of
regulatory bodies that have to be able to decide independently on the basis of
scientific and technological knowledge.191 Furthermore, the idea of an international
peer review of the regulatory framework governing the safety of nuclear installations,
if the contracting party has an operating nuclear installation, was endorsed.192
The significance of IAEA standards was also a point of agreement between the parties
and it was recommended that parties ‘‘take into account the IAEA Safety Standards
in enhancing nuclear safety’’193 and ‘‘inform how they intend to take the IAEA Safety
185. IAEA, ‘‘2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of Nuclear Safety:
Final Summary Report’’ (27231 August 2012), online: IAEA /http://www-ns.iaea.orgS, para. 2.
186. Ibid., at para. 3
187. IAEA, ‘‘Guidelines Regarding the Review Process Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety’’ (8
October 1998), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.orgS.
188. IAEA, ‘‘Guidelines Regarding National Reports Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety’’ (8 October
1998), online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.orgS.
189. IAEA, ‘‘Convention on Nuclear Safety: Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules’’ (4 April 2011),
online: IAEA /http://www.iaea.orgS.
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Standards into account in implementing the NSC’’.194 Another one of the main
achievements is the establishment of the working group, open to all contracting
parties, which is tasked with ‘‘reporting to the next review meeting on a list of
actions to strengthen the NSC and on proposals to amend, where necessary, the
Convention’’.195
More specific recommendations that are in line with Kamminga’s view on the
need for expert review as a supervisory tool were made by the Swiss Confederation
and the Russian Confederation. Both contracting parties also recognized the
importance of international peer review missions involving external experts from
other contracting parties, which can play an important role in achieving and
maintaining a high level of nuclear safety. Although this is not a binding obligation, it
is promising to see that on this occasion the Swiss Confederation proposed several
amendments to the NSC, including, inter alia, amendments to Articles 8, 14, 17, 18,
and 19. Interestingly, all proposed amendments concern NSC obligations that Japan
failed to meet. In regard to the work of the regulatory body, the Swiss Confederation
proposed periodic review of the regulatory body by external experts with regard to
its compliance with the requirements of the IAEA. This also applies to the design,
construction, and operation of the installation. Bearing in mind the importance
of taking into account the development of relevant technical standards, the
Swiss Confederation proposed the amendment of Articles 14 and 17, whereby the
assessment and verification of safety and the revaluation of siting is to be carried out
in accordance with state-of-the-art science and technology and other significant new
safety information.196
The proposal of the Russian Federation was more explicit and included ‘‘taking
into account IAEA safety standards’’ in relation to Article 14 on the assessment and
verification of safety, which would finally resolve the doubt about the legally binding
nature of these standards. This recommendation, in line with the argument about the
importance of IAEA safety standards in assessing compliance with the NSC, is
reflected in the recognition of the technical and scientific support organizations, and
continuous development of the IAEA safety standards in the light of the Fukushima
accident, as well as encouragement for contracting parties to take IAEA safety
standards into account in enhancing nuclear safety.
Most of the recommendations were accepted by the Japanese government, which
undertook extensive institutional and legislative reform which, inter alia, included
the establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the training of staff, and
amending the Reactor Regulation Act, including legislation on external events197 and
severe accident measures, as well as strengthening the safety culture at all levels. The
Japanese government also recognized the need to develop domestic standards and
rules consistent with international standards, especially the IAEA standards, and to
194. Ibid., at 2.
195. Ibid., at 33.
196. Ibid.
197. See supra note 95. For example, the NSC reconsidered the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic
Design, and proposed their amendment proposals to this Regulatory Guide in March 2012.
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have frequent IAEA international peer review missions.198 Likewise, in July 2011
NISA requested a stress test to be conducted on all Japan’s nuclear power plants
in line with the efforts of the EU to verify the safety of its own plants. This
development should improve the understanding of the current safety of all nuclear
installations in Japan.
v. conclusion
The Convention on Nuclear Safety always generated a certain ambivalence due to
the vagueness of its provisions, which require subsequent adoption of national
measures, and its poor enforcement mechanism. Kamminga considers it to be a
disappointing convention which:
[C]ontains neither the precise standards of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents, the flexible amendment and gentle non-compliance procedures
of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, nor the incentive
provisions of the Convention on Climate Change.199
Despite this lack of specific and detailed rules prescribed by the NSC, it still
contains obligations for contracting parties that are to be implemented in respect of
both existing and new nuclear installations. It may be questionable what kind of
obligation it raises for states as only ‘‘specific obligations resulting from treaties
impose upon the contracting States the obligation to take the necessary measures
through exercising due diligence in order to prevent the nuclear damage, either by
prohibiting or by regulating such activities’’.200 Bearing in mind the need to clarify
rules contained in the NSC, the IAEA developed various safety installation standards
that cover all areas governed by the Convention. Although they are not binding, they
provide sufficient technical guidelines for contracting parties in developing required
national measures. The IAEA nuclear safety standards are considered to be the
‘‘cornerstone for an international nuclear safety and security mechanism which
provides the basis for states to perform their duties relating to nuclear safety’’.201
Furthermore, the obligation of the installation state to ‘‘establish and maintain a
legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations’’202
stems from both the principle of due diligence and the principle of prevention of
environmental damage.203 In addition, the NSC prescribes the party’s obligation to
ensure that each licence-holder meets its responsibility.
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The Fukushima nuclear accident raised questions about the implementation of the
Convention by the Japanese government and identified the need to reassess the
obligation of each contracting party deriving from the NSC provisions in the light
of lessons learned from the accident. Several major deficiencies, such as the lack of
independence of the regulatory body from the body entrusted with the promotion of
nuclear energy and its ineffectiveness in dealing with severe accidents, may
demonstrate the failure of the Japanese government in exercising the obligation of
due diligence. Moreover, serious oversight in evaluating all relevant site- and design-
related factors, the design and construction of the installation, and effectively
responding to the emergency additionally validate the argument about the lack of
due diligence. This obligation involves the responsibility of a state to ensure the safe
operation of all nuclear installations in the country through licensing, assessment and
verification of safety, quality assurance, and the development of emergency plans and
procedures, regardless of the fact that the plant was operated by a private company.
Moreover, Japan’s failure to inform countries in the vicinity that were likely to be
affected by the ongoing nuclear accident about the release of the radioactive
materials into seawater may also raise questions about meeting its international
obligation towards these countries.204
This catastrophic accident also reiterated the importance of the due diligence
principle in regard to the question of compliance with the Convention on Nuclear
Safety and the IAEA safety standards. As was stated in the Pulp Mills Case,205 the due
diligence obligation represents ‘‘an obligation which entails not only the adoption
of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in
their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public
and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such
operators’’.206 Since these rules and measures must be ‘‘in accordance with applicable
international agreements’’ and ‘‘in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and
recommendations of international technical bodies’’,207 it becomes evident that Japan
breached its due diligence obligation by failing to comply with the NSC and the
relevant IAEA standards. This obligation would particularly require Japan to follow
the technical standards developed by the IAEA, which ensure the NSC’s ‘‘objective of
securing the safe use of nuclear energy’’.
As after the Chernobyl disaster, these claims may encourage academic discussion
on state responsibility for nuclear damage, although there are very few precedents in
relation to this issue. The existence of both elements of state responsibility for a
wrongful act involving the breach of an international obligation of the state and the
attribution of the conduct to the state were demonstrated in relation to several NSC
provisions. However, the fact remains that so far no states have raised the question of
204. See supra note 95 at 39. Even in its national report for the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the NSC,
Japan recognized the cases in which information—such as the outflow of water with high-level
radioactivity and the discharge of stagnant water with low-level radioactivity to the sea in April
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Japan’s state responsibility for nuclear damage, which can be explained by several
reasons. Authors agree that one of the main reasons that may explain this is the
absence of state practice.208 So far only the claim in the case of the Cosmos 954209
crash can be distinguished. Some authors also point out the case of the Japanese
fisherman, although it involved the payment of compensation without the US
admitting legal responsibility.210 Perhaps a more convincing reason is the tacit
solidarity between states, especially those who are extensive users of nuclear energy.
As Guruswamy points out, ‘‘it is perfectly feasible that states declined to prefer
claims for fear of establishing precedents that could be used against them’’.211 Finally,
more successful international private law mechanisms channelled through the notion
of civil liability may explain the behaviour of states in cases of a nuclear damage.212
The accident exposed the ineffectiveness of the Convention’s preventive
monitoring mechanisms; a stronger monitoring regime would seem indispensable
in preventing another Fukushima. This could be rectified by the introduction of
expert peer review, as suggested by Kamminga, or by amending the NSC
provisions.213 In the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, states felt ready to adopt
the NSC in an effort to provide the legislative and regulatory framework for the
safety of nuclear installations. This latest nuclear incident motivated states to
reconsider existing safety rules and render them more precise and detailed. At the
2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the NSC,214 the contracting
parties made several suggestions which demonstrated their willingness to improve
the effectiveness of the Convention. The proposals to introduce external expert
review, the assessment and verification of safety in accordance with state-of-the-art
science and technology and the IAEA standards reiterated the need to revisit the
Convention and to further develop the IAEA standards and use them in assessing
compliance with the NSC. However, time will tell if the contracting parties are ready
to do what is needed to achieve the Convention’s objective of ensuring a high level of
nuclear safety worldwide.
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